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Abstract
Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the
transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow
situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers. Some
of the value of failing passes through to option prices: when failing is cheaper than
borrowing, the relation between borrowing costs and option prices is significantly
weaker. The remaining value is profit to the market maker, and its ability to profit
despite the usual competition between market makers appears to result from a cost
advantage of larger market makers at failing.
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The market for short exposure in the United States clears differently from the
market for long exposure. This difference has attracted considerable recent interest from
both the SEC and market participants who frequently short-sell or whose stock is sold
short.1 The interest is in both the economics of clearing and in the pricing of the affected
assets, which could be high or inefficient. Our goal is to establish the role and economic
significance of an unfamiliar but important clearing tactic: failing to deliver.
Short sales are usually accomplished through equity loans. The short-seller
borrows shares from an equity lender which he delivers to the buyer. This debt of shares
to the lender gives him short exposure going forward. But there is another way to create
the same exposure: by failing to deliver the shares. If the short-seller delivers nothing to
the buyer, thereby incurring a debt of shares to the buyer, this also gives him short
exposure going forward. This alternative moves the risk that the short-seller does not
repay his debt from the equity lender to the buyer, but just as equity lenders have a
mechanism for ensuring performance, i.e. collateral, so does the buyer. The clearing
corporation intermediating the trade takes margin and marks it to market, thereby
defending buyers against their sellers’ non-performance. If equity loans are expensive,
unavailable, or unreliable, as research shows they can be (e.g. D’Avolio, 2002, Geczy,
Musto and Reed, 2002, Jones and Lamont, 2002, Lamont 2004) then this alternative
appears desirable, to short sellers if not to buyers. But considering the market rules that
bind short sales to equity loans, how is it feasible?

1

In July of 2004 the SEC passed regulation SHO which limits the ability of certain market participants to
sell stock short without borrowing to cover their position. The discussion period for regulation SHO
attracted considerable attention from the business press.
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The answer, we show, lies in the special access to delivery fails that option
market-makers enjoy. Traders are generally obliged to locate shares to borrow before
shorting, but those engaged in bona-fide hedging of market-making activity are exempt
from this requirement. So unlike traders in general, a market maker can short sell
without having located shares to borrow. If he does not locate shares to borrow then he
fails to deliver, someone on the other side fails to receive, and therefore retains the
purchase price, and the clearing corporation starts taking margin. While it lasts, this
arrangement is effectively an equity loan from the buyer to the seller at a zero rebate. But
whether it lasts depends on the reaction of the trader being failed to. If a buyer does not
get his shares then he can demand them, in which case a short-seller who failed is bought
in: he must go buy the shares and hand them over. If that short-seller wants to maintain
his short exposure he must short again, so this demand increases his shorting cost by this
roundtrip transactions cost. Thus, the cost of failing to deliver is the cost of a zero-rebate
equity loan plus the expected incidence of buy-in costs. If this incidence is low enough,
then failing is a valuable alternative to borrowing the harder-to-borrow stocks. We show
that the alternative to fail is valuable and key to the pricing and trading of options.
First, we show that shorting costs move options out of parity. That is, synthetic
shorts constructed from options trade below spot-market prices when shorting is costly,
i.e. when interest rebates on equity loans are low, and this disparity grows as the rebate
falls. However, this growth slows when the rebate falls below zero, consistent with
option market-makers choosing failure over negative rebates, and sharing some of the
savings. Furthermore, the short interest of a major option market maker grows, as a
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fraction of marketwide short interest, as rebates fall, consistent with the market maker
having and sharing an advantage getting short exposure to hard-to-borrow stocks.
We can see the advantage directly in the market maker’s shorting experience.
Half the time the market maker shorts a hard-to-borrow stock, it fails to deliver at least
some of the shares. And it never accepts a negative rebate, always choosing to fail
instead. This advantage could in principle be offset by frequent buy-ins, but we find a
very low frequency of buy-ins, executed with small price concessions.
How much of this advantage does the market maker share? Estimating the market
maker’s trading profits, net of rebate reductions and buy-ins, we document a significant
average profit. This profit seems at odds with the competitiveness of options markets,
but we show that it corresponds to the way the clearing corporation handles buy-ins. The
highest-volume option market makers, such as our data supplier, likely benefit from the
clearing corporation’s practice of assigning buy-ins to the oldest fails. That is, when a
number of short-sellers’ brokers are failing on the same stock and a buyer’s broker
demands shares, the clearing corporation passes this demand to the broker whose fail
started first. This favors the few highest-volume traders because, since their portfolios
turn over so much, their fails are rarely the oldest. Thus, we hypothesize that optionmarket competition tends to oligopoly as stocks grow hard to short.
To test our hypothesis that market-maker competition weakens as specialness
grows, we test whether options’ bid/ask spreads grow as specialness grows. We find that
they do. We also find that our data provider, a large market maker, is bought in much
less frequently than average, and that when it is bought it in, this corresponds to when
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option volume is lower, and therefore its advantage at avoiding buy-ins is smaller. We
therefore conclude that at least some of the profits result from limits to competition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the literature,
Section II describes the database, Section III presents the results and Section IV
concludes. An appendix provides background information and relevant details regarding
short selling and delivery.
I. Related Literature
This paper is not the first to document that shorting frictions associate with
breakdowns of put call parity. Lamont and Thaler (2001) find that impediments to short
selling prevent traders from exploiting seemingly profitable arbitrage strategies resulting
from the misalignment of stock prices in equity carve-outs. Similarly, Ofek, Richardson
and Whitelaw (2004) measure the relationship between increased borrowing costs and
put-call disparity and find cumulative abnormal returns for arbitrage strategies involving
put-call disparity exceed 65%. But, as in Jarrow and O’Hara (1989), market
imperfections prevent most arbitrageurs from turning the misalignment into a profit. The
put-call parity trades studied here can only be performed by market participants who can
always borrow stock or short sell without borrowing stock. In other words, rebate rates
are only valid if stocks are found and borrowed. Our study has the unique advantage of a
coherent approach that combines actual borrowing costs and feasibility for one market
participant: a large options market maker.
Furthermore, this paper is not the first to discuss settlement fails; there is a strand
of literature which studies settlement and settlement failures in markets other than U.S.
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equities. In the context of monetary policy, Johnson (1998) finds that technological
improvements in the banking settlement system have affected monetary policy. In the
context of foreign exchange, Kahn and Roberds (2001), show that settlement through a
private intermediary bank can mitigate some of the unique risks associated with foreign
exchange settlement. Fleming and Garbade (2002) find that settlement fails jumped
following the September 11th attacks as a result of the destruction of communication
facilities.2
In this paper, we identify the possibility of profiting from the misalignment, due
to short-sale costs, of stock and options markets for market participants who have the
option to fail to deliver shares, and we show how limited access to this option is a barrier
to entry that prevents competition from realigning market prices. This work relates
primarily to three topics in the finance literature: equity lending, the relation of observed
prices to Black-Scholes, and deviations from put-call parity. We briefly review each.

A. The Equity Lending Market.
A number of recent papers have examined variation in the cost of borrowing stock
in the equity lending market. Reed (2002) uses one year of daily equity loan data to
measure the reduction in informational efficiency resulting from short-sale costs. Geczy,
Musto and Reed (2002) measure the impact of equity-loan prices on a variety of trading
strategies involving short selling. The paper finds prices in the equity lending market do
not preclude short-sellers from getting negative exposure to effects on average, but in the

2

More recently, Boni (2005) explores market-wide failing data from the clearing corporation.
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case of stock-specific merger arbitrage trades, short selling impediments reduce profits
substantially. Christoffersen, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2005a, 2005b) use the same
database to study stock loans that are not necessarily related to short selling. The paper
finds an increase in both quantity and price of loans on dividend record dates when the
transfer of legal ownership leads to tax benefits. Using another database of rebate rates,
Ofek and Richardson (2003) demonstrate that short selling is generally more difficult for
Internet stocks in early 2000, and D’Avolio (2002) uses 18 months of daily data to relate
specialness to a variety of stock-specific characteristics. Jones and Lamont (2002) study
borrowing around the crash of 1929; the paper finds that hard-to-borrow stocks had low
future returns. Finally, Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2002) formulate a search model of
the equity lending market.

B. Predicted and Observed Options Prices.
By relating short selling to option prices, this paper also contributes to the large
literature on the difference between Black-Scholes (1973) options prices and observed
option prices. MacBeth and Merville (1979) and Rubinstein (1985) show that,
empirically, implied volatilities are not equal across option classes and that deviations are
systematic. As in Derman and Kani (1994), these systematic deviations are commonly
referred to as the volatility smile. Longstaff (1995) shows that the difference between
Black-Scholes and actual option prices increase with option bid-ask spreads and decrease
with market liquidity. While Longstaff’s results are contested in later work (i.e. Strong
and Xu (1999)), he provides a novel approach to testing the impact of market frictions on
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option prices. Dumas, Flemming and Whaley (1998) test a range of time- and statedependent models of volatility meant to account for observed deviations from BlackScholes prices. The paper concludes that these models still leave a large mean-square
error when explaining market prices. Using Spanish index options, Peña, Rubio and
Serna (1999) find evidence consistent with U.S. markets; they find a positive and
significant contribution of the bid-ask spread to the slope of the volatility smile. Dennis
and Mayhew (2000) examine the contribution of various measures of market risk and
sentiment on individual index options and find that both are correlated with the smile.

C. Tests of Put-Call Parity
Some of the evidence on the impact of short-sale impediments on options prices is
presented here in terms of put-call parity. Tests of put-call parity date back to
Klemkosky and Resnick (1979) who find option market prices to be largely consistent
with put-call parity. In a related paper that focuses on the speed of adjustment of option
and stock markets, Manaster and Rendleman (1982) conclude that closing options prices
contain information about equilibrium stock prices that is not contained in closing stock
prices. While the implied stock price measure employed in our work differs substantially
from that of Manaster and Rendleman (1982), the approach of comparing actual and
implied stock prices is similar.

II. Data
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We combine several databases in this study. First, a prominent options market
maker provided rebate rates, failing positions and a database of buy-ins and execution
prices on those buy-ins. For equity options prices, implied volatilities, option volume and
open interest, we use the OptionMetrics database. Finally, the interest rate term structure
is estimated using commercial paper rates from the Federal Reserve (see Appendix B for
details).

A. Rebate Rates, Fails and Buy-Ins.
A large options market-making firm has generously provided a database of their
rebate rates, fails and buy-ins for 1998 and 1999. The rebate rates are the interest rates
on cash collateral for stock loans quoted by the market maker’s prime broker. Different
borrowers are likely to face different rates; this database is a description of one large
market maker’s experience. As discussed in Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), rebate rates
allow us to measure the difficulty of borrowing shares, or specialness.
We construct a measure of specialness for each stock on each date. Specifically,
specialness on any stock is the difference between the general collateral rate and the
rebate rate on that stock. Following Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), we estimate the
general collateral rate as the Federal Funds Rate minus the equity lender’s fixed
commission. Specialness is zero for most stocks, and it is positive for specials, or hardto-borrow stocks. In Panel B of Table IV, we augment our market maker’s specialness
database with specialness from a large custodian lender as described in Geczy, Musto and
Reed (2002).

9

The rebate rates cover all stocks in the Russell 3000 index, and we have limited
our other databases to that subset of U.S. equities using constitution lists from the Frank
Russell Company. The Russell 3000 includes the 3000 largest stocks in the U.S based on
May 31st market capitalization. In 1997, stocks larger than $171.7M were included. The
cutoff was $221.9M in 1998 and $171.2M in 1999.
The database also indicates when this market maker is failing to deliver shares on
any of its short positions. Even though we do not have data on any of this market
maker’s specific trades, we do have information about this market maker’s buy-ins. The
buy-in database has purchase dates, settlement dates and execution prices for every buyin 1998 and 1999.

B. Options Data
We use the Ivy DB OptionMetrics database for US Equity option prices, spreads
and volume. We use the average of the lowest closing ask and the highest closing bid, or
the midquote, as the options price. We apply three filters that are common elsewhere in
the options literature (e.g. Dumas, Whaley and Fleming (1998) and Bakshi, Cao and
Chen (1997)). First, we remove options with fewer than 6 calendar days to maturity to
mitigate liquidity bias. Second, we remove options with prices less than $0.375 to
minimize price discreteness. Third, as described in Table I, no-arbitrage restrictions are
applied to the option quotes.
Table I indicates that he intersection of the rebate and option databases contains
19,723,466 observations. After filtering, the database contains 11,437,401 observations.
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This is daily price data for options with various strike prices and maturity dates on
449,721 unique stock/days. On average, there are 890 stocks per day on the 504 trading
days in the sample.

III. Results
The empirical results are ordered as follows. First, we address the significance to
a market maker of its option to fail, both in the incidence of failing and in the relation of
failing to high equity-loan costs. Next, we relate equity-loan costs to the price of a
synthetic short position as determined by put-call parity, and we ask if this relation is
sensitive to whether the option to fail is in the money, i.e. whether the rebate rate is less
than zero. Then we gauge whether the mispricing of the synthetic short position is a
result of expensive puts or cheap calls using implied volatility as a measure of price. We
then calculate the expected cost of buy-ins, which is the product of the incidence of buyins and their execution quality. Using this actual incidence and price of buy-ins, we
compute the market-maker’s net profits from providing synthetic shorts in hard-toborrow situations. Finally, in response to the positive profits we document, we address
the possibility that option-market competition is limited when the underlying is hard to
borrow.

A. Specialness and Delivery Failure
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Our database shows the data supplier’s short position, for each stock in the
Russell 3000 and each day in 1998-99, and in particular it shows whether the position
was achieved through borrowing, failing or both. It also tells us the rebate received on
borrowed shares, whether failed shares were bought in, and if so, at what price. Thus, we
can sort short positions into five major categories: General Collateral, Reduced Rebate,
Reduced Rebate and Fail, Fail Only and Buy-In. General Collateral indicates that a
stock has been loaned at the normal rebate rate; i.e. the stock is easy to borrow. Reduced
Rebate indicates that the rebate rate is below the general collateral rate; i.e. the stock is on
special. Reduced Rebate and Fail indicates that some shares have been borrowed at a
reduced rebate, and that the market maker failed to deliver some shares that were sold
short. Fail Only indicates that the market maker failed to deliver any of the shares in this
short position. Buy-In indicates that the counterparty of the short-sale transaction is
forcing delivery on some or all of the shares in the short position. Table II, Panel A,
reports the incidence of each.
Consistent with earlier work, a large majority, 91.24%, of stocks are available for
borrowing at general collateral rates. The remaining 8.76% are the specials. Breaking out
this 8.76%, we find 4.19% where borrowing simply continues at lower rebates, but in the
remaining 4.57% the market maker fails to deliver, partially or completely. Failing is thus
an important part of the story; more than half of the time the option to fail is used when
stocks are on special. Any analysis of the relationship between short-sale impediments
and options prices is at least incomplete, and perhaps severely biased, without
consideration of the option to fail.
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We would expect options market makers to fail more often as rebate rates fall to
zero. Our sample bears this out. Panel B of Table II shows 89.65% of the failing
positions occurring when rebates are at the lowest rate in our sample, zero, and only
1.39% of the non-failing positions have rebates at zero. So failing predominates when
rebates hit zero, and delivery predominates when rebates are positive. We also find, in
unreported results, that the probability of at least some failure grows 15.66% for each 1%
decrease in the rebate.3 Thus we conclude that failure is tightly linked to low rebates.

B. Specialness and Option Prices.
We expect option prices to reflect the costs of hedging, including the costs of
short selling. We use our measure of short-sale costs, specialness, and two measures of
options prices to characterize this relationship. First, we use put-call parity to measure
misalignments of stock and options markets. Second, we refer to the options’ implied
volatilities, as calculated in Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), to gauge whether puts or
calls are more responsible for what we find.
B.1. Put-Call Parity
The effect of short-sale costs on option prices can be seen via the European putcall parity relation. Put-call parity states that the value of a European call option plus the
discounted value of the option’s strike price is equal to the value of the underlying asset
plus the value of a European put with the same strike price and maturity:
3

Taking those observations for which specialness is positive and the rebate rate is positive, we run a
logistic regression of failing on specialness with cross-sectional and time-series fixed effects. The
dependent variable is 1 if there is any failing in a particular stock on a given day. The coefficient estimate
on specialness is 0.1455 (p-value < 0.0001). The odds ratio point estimate is 1.1566.
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C + e-rτK = P + S
where C is the price of a European call option on stock S with strike price K, e-rτK is the
present value of K, and P is a put option with strike price K. C and P are assumed to
have the same time to maturity, τ.
This relationship allows a trader to replicate the payoffs of any single instrument
in the equation with a combination of the other three instruments. For example, the stock
price implied by this put-call parity relationship, or the implied stock price, is
Si = C - P+ e-rτK.
For stocks with dividends paid during the life of the option, the present value of
dividends is added to the right hand side of the equation.
After computing the stock price implied by put-call parity, we compute the
percentage deviation of the implied stock price from the actual stock price. This is
computed by subtracting the implied stock price from the actual stock price and
normalizing by the actual stock price:
∆ j ,t =

S j ,t − S ij ,t
S j ,t

,

where Sj,t is the price of stock j on day t from the spot market and Sij,t is the price of stock
j on day t implied by put-call parity. We refer to ∆j,t as put-call disparity. Table III shows
the distribution of this measure, which shows some dispersion; the 5th percentile is
−0.98% and the 95th percentile is 1.95%.
Some of this dispersion does not relate to arbitrage opportunities. Dividendrelated early exercise differentiates the European options of the parity relation from the
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American options of the database; we address this below by excluding stocks that paid
dividends in the past year. Early exercise also arises with deep-in-the-money puts, which
we address by using only the option pair with moneyness (S/K) closest to one, and
shortest time to expiration. Since near-the-money and close-to-maturity options tend to
be more actively traded, this also mitigates the effects of stale prices, which we further
address by removing options for which the volume or open interest is equal to zero.
Another source of dispersion is microstructure effects. As Battalio and Schultz
(2005) document, end-of-day prices deliver noisy estimates of actual arbitrage
opportunities, as they may not be prices that were simultaneously available for trade.
And even if prices are simultaneous and midpoint prices are exactly in line with put-call
parity, if the stock price were at either an ask or a bid while the options were both at their
midpoints, put-call disparity for the average stock in our sample would be 0.53%4. But as
long as these measurement errors do not correlate with rebates, they do not interfere with
our tests. That is, they are as likely to subtract from our measured profits as add to them.
We test the null hypothesis that short selling is not associated with put-call
disparity with the following regression:

∆j,t = a + bSpecialnessj,t + cMoneynessj,t + dTime-to-Maturityj,t + ej,t
where Specialnessj,t is specialness in stock j on date t. Moneyness is defined as the stock
price divided by the strike price and Time-to-Maturity is the number of calendar days to

4

The median bid-ask spread in stocks in our sample is $0.23 (mean $0.25) . The median stock price in the
sample is $21.69 (mean $27.04). If put and call prices are midpoints and the stock is at either the bid or the
ask, then put call parity will be different from zero by 0.23/(2*21.69) = 0.0053.
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expiration of the option. We include fixed effects for both time series and cross-sectional
effects. Panel A of Table IV reports the fitted model.
The significantly negative coefficient on Specialness confirms that as specialness
increases, so does the shortfall of synthetic short from the spot. Thus, specialness passes
through to option prices, consistent with findings elsewhere. The new question is
whether the option to fail passes through to option prices. Since the option to fail can
reduce a market maker’s shorting costs when rebates are negative, but not when they are
positive, its effect would be a weakening of the relation between specialness and option
prices as rebates go negative. That is, reducing the rebate from 2% to 1% increases the
market maker’s shorting cost by exactly that much, as failing is not a cheaper alternative
to borrowing in either case, but reducing it from -1% to -2% increases it less, to the
extent that market maker is failing rather than borrowing. To test this hypothesis we need
to use specialness data that shows when the market rebate is negative, so we use the
‘custodial’ data instead.
The test design is the same as before, only that now we focus on just the stocks
that are currently on special, and we add a regressor Negative Rebate Specialness which
is zero when the rebate is positive, and is equal to the specialness, i.e. has the same value
as Specialness, when the rebate is negative. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient on
Negative Rebate Specialness is not significantly negative. The result is in Table IV,
Panel B.
The regression rejects the null; the relation between rebates and option prices is
indeed significantly weaker – at the point estimate, about 50% less - for negative than for

16

positive rebates. This indicates that the option to fail plays a significant role in option
pricing.

B.2. Distinguishing the Effect on Puts and Calls
The relation between specialness and synthetic shorts indicates some combination
of puts growing expensive and calls growing cheap. To gauge whether one is more
important than the other, we need to separate puts from calls and relate their prices to
model. The testable questions become, are the implied volatilities of the puts
significantly high, and are the implied volatilities of the calls significantly low?
For each option, we use implied volatility from OptionMetrics, which uses the
industry standard Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) binomial tree method for calculating
implied volatilities. Using a fixed effects regression, we examine the relationship of
implied volatilities with the moneyness, time-to-maturity, and specialness as well as
time-series and cross-sectional fixed effects. The estimation results from several
parameterizations of the following regressions are presented in Table V.

σj,timplied = γ0+γ1Moneynessj,t + γ2Time-to-Maturityj,t + γ3Specialnessj,t + ej,t

where moneyness is defined as S/K, and time to maturity is measured in calendar days.
We include fixed effects for both time series and cross-sectional effects. Consistent with
the results for index options from Derman and Kani (1994) and Longstaff (1985), we find
that the implied volatility of put options increases with moneyness. The coefficient on
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moneyness for call options is statistically negative but the slope is almost flat. Consistent
with Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997), our regression results show that implied volatility
decreases with time to maturity.
For puts, both the presence and the magnitude of specialness are statistically
significant and positive. Thus, we conclude that specialness increases the prices of puts.
Calls prices do not show this sensitivity; neither the presence or the magnitude of
specialness has a statistically significant effect on call prices. Thus, when we separate the
synthetic short into its components we detect a significant positive effect of specialness
on the cost of buying puts, and no effect on the revenue from writing calls.

C. Abnormal Profits
C.1. Buy-in Costs.
The other cost of failing, besides the foregone interest from the withheld purchase
price, is the expected cost of being bought in. When the market maker is bought in, the
clearing corporation executes the purchase, and the market maker must execute a new
short sale to restore its position. Thus, the market maker’s expected buy-in cost is the
probability of a buy-in times this round-trip cost. Table II shows that 86 of the 69,063
failing positions, or 0.12%, were bought in over the 2-year period. Taking this realization
as the expected incidence of buy-ins, the expected incidence of buy-in costs is this figure
times the expected transactions cost, conditional on a buy-in.
Because the clearing corporation executes the buy-in, execution quality may not be
optimized, and may therefore be costly to the market maker. To gauge this other leg of
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buy-in cost we relate the transaction prices of the 86 buy-ins to prevailing market prices.
Table VI, Panel A shows that the buy-in trades are executed at prices 0.53% worse than
the volume weighted average price (VWAP) for the given stock on the buy-in day. The
departure from VWAP is statistically significant but even so, if we assume that the
market maker pays the same 0.53% to put the short back on, the overall expected buy-in
cost is (0.12%)(2)(0.53%), or 0.1bp. So the expected buy-in cost is, for our market
maker at least, vanishingly small.

C.2 Abnormal Profit Strategies
In this section we combine the data on rebate rates and buy-in costs to calculate
the profitability, to the market maker who provided our data, of providing synthetic
shorts on hard-to-borrow stocks. In the section following we consider why the profits we
document could be available in equilibrium.
Our profitability measure follows a simple trading strategy, designed to avoid the
attribution issues documented by Battalio and Schultz (2005). In particular, we decide
whether to put on the trade based on whether the stock is on special, not on whether our
database shows disparity, and then we hold the trade to expiration. If instead we went in
and out of the trade depending on the apparent disparity in the data, we would mistake
some measurement error for profitability.
We focus on liquid options and reduce the influence of known biases by selecting
the option pair with maturity as short as possible and moneyness closest to one. We also

19

reduce the incidence of early exercise bias, without risking any look-ahead bias, by using
only stocks that didn’t pay dividends in the past year.
Our database allows us to calculate profits net of the exact shorting costs. If our
market maker got a rebate we use that rebate but if they failed we use a rebate of zero.
Assuming the market maker’s opportunity cost of capital at time t is the risk-free rate r(t),
and denoting his concurrent rebate for a given stock q(t), the short sale cost paid by the
borrower on day t can be written r(t)-q(t). If our data show that a stock was bought in,
we subtract the cost of the buy-in by subtracting the buy-in price from the stock’s VWAP
that day. The assumption is that the market maker keeps the position going by shorting
anew at VWAP on the same day. The profits from this strategy can be written as
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where the position is opened at t=0 and closed at t=T.
We look at the profits to short-selling actual stock and buying synthetic stock
whenever that stock goes on special. We see in Table VII that such a strategy would
involve 6086 option pairs and yield an average profit of $0.1346 per trade. The profit is
statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001, and corresponds to $13.46 per
option contract. Thus, the market maker profits, in equilibrium, by providing these
synthetic shorts. In our final section we propose and test a hypothesis for why this
happens.
D. Why Aren’t Abnormal Profits Competed Away?
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What accounts for the equilibrium profitability we document? Why aren’t more
market makers buying these cheap synthetic long positions, bidding them up to zero
profitability? We hypothesize that the clearing corporation handles fails in a way that
favors higher-volume market makers, resulting in weaker competition when stocks grow
special. We test this hypothesis on the relation between specialness and quoted spreads.
The hypothesis follows from how the clearing corporation assigns buy-ins. If a
fail must be bought-in, this buy-in is assigned to the oldest fail (see Appendix A).
Assuming a higher-volume market maker is more likely to move from a short position to
flat (or positive) and back again, it is less likely to have the oldest fail and therefore less
likely to be bought in. Thus, we hypothesize that higher-volume market makers, such as
our data provider, enjoy a cost advantage with hard-to-borrow stocks, and that this
advantage limits competition to make markets in the affected options.
If our market maker faces lower competition when specialness is higher then its
market share of short exposure, i.e. its total short position as a fraction of economy-wide
short interest, should grow as specialness grows. This would suggest that shorting via this
option market maker, rather than some other way, becomes more attractive as shorting
constraints tighten. Regressing the market share (Market Maker’s SI)/(Market SI) on
Specialness,, we find (p-values in parentheses):
(Market Maker’s SI) / (Market SI) = -0.06902 + 0.04037*Specialness
(0.2795) (0.0197)
Market share increases significantly with specialness, indicating that shorting frictions
encourage shorting via this option market maker, and therefore that shorting frictions
impose less cost on this option market maker than on traders in general.
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So this market maker gains short-interest market share as specialness grows, but
in principle all option market makers could be gaining short-interest market share. To
address the competitiveness between option market makers we need a measure of the
current competition to make a market in a stock’s options, and the natural candidate is the
price charged, the current bid/ask spread.
Option spreads are subject to limits which often bind.5 The SEC, which sets these
limits, finds that quoted spreads are at their maxima between 21% and 57% of the time
(SEC, 2000). This is consistent with our sample; we find 36% of put options and 32% of
call options at their maximum spreads. Thus, the relevant measure of spread width is
whether it is at the maximum.
Accordingly, to relate spreads to specialness, we fit a probit model where the
dependent variable indicates maximum width, and specialness is an explanatory variable.
To control for demand-side circumstances that could affect spreads, we also include
trading volume and open interest in the option, time to expiration and distance from atthe money (i.e. absolute value of 1-S/K). The result is in Table VIII.
The probit strongly rejects the null; trading at the maximum spread increases
significantly with specialness. Thus, the evidence supports the hypothesis that
specialness weakens option-market competition.

5

The Securities and Exchange Rule 1014(c)(i)(A) and Advice F-6 prescribe maximum
quote spreads for equity options. The rule establishes maximum widths as follows: $0.25
for options priced between $0.50 and $2, $0.375 for options priced between $2 and $5,
$0.5 fro options priced between $5 and $10, $0.75 for options priced between $10 and
$20, and $1 for options priced above $20.
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Another way to test the hypothesis that turnover gives large market makers a cost
advantage by protecting them from buy-ins is to test whether this advantage dissipates
when volume drops. That is, we can test whether our data provider’s success at avoiding
buy-ins declines when option turnover declines. We do this by fitting a probit to all fails,
where the dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) the position is bought in, and the
explanatory variables are option turnover (volume over open interest) along with other
circumstances associated with buy-ins. What we find, in Table IX, is that turnover is
significantly negative, as predicted: the less options turn over, the more the position is
bought in.
Finally, we can see directly that our data supplier experiences an abnormally low
incidence of buy-ins on its fails. On the average day, across the 502 sample trading days,
this large market maker is failing on 4.4M shares. This is about 1.75% of the ~250M
fails on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks on the average day, in Boni (2005) (see
Figure 1 of that paper). In Table II we see that our market maker experienced 86 buy-ins
across the 502 days, or about 1/6 buy-in per day. If this is about 1.75% of buy-ins, we
should see about 10 buy-ins per day. But the DTCC reports more than 4,300 buy-in
notices per day,6 and the fraction of notices that result in buy-ins is presumably greater
than 1/430. Thus, our data provider’s fails appear relatively unlikely, compared to other
traders’ fails, to beget buy-ins.

6

This figure represents only the notices transmitted via the DTC’s Participant Exchange service; see
“DTCC Will Automate and Streamline Buy-In Notification for Securities,” a DTCC press release at
http://www.dtcc.com/PressRoom/2005/buyin.html
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IV. Conclusion
We show that the option to fail is significant to both the trading and pricing of equity
options. We show that it is often in-the-money, and that when it is, market makers profit
and so do their customers. The profit to market makers is puzzling, considering their
competitiveness, but we resolve this puzzle by documenting limits to competition in
options on hard-to-borrow stocks, and tracing these limits to the clearing corporation’s
rules for assigning buy-ins.
A delivery fail is nearly a single-stock futures contract, the only difference being
the uncertainty about expiration. Thus, the popularity of failing may help explain why
single-stock futures attract so little interest. The futures can improve on the spot when
the spot is hard to borrow – this was the major selling point of the futures when they were
introduced – but in that situation, fails provide the same improvement. Futures can
provide other improvements, such as efficiencies with dividends and votes, but these are
sparse in the fiscal year, unlikely to sustain trading.
The popularity of failing and the price improvements it provides short sellers
encourage us to step back and consider the economic case for delivery. Delivery
provides 100% insurance to both sides of a trade; by exchanging cash for securities,
traders eliminate 100% of their mutual exposure. 100% insurance is unambiguously
optimal when it is free, but not when it is costly, so the search for efficiency should bring
traders to a mechanism for buying less insurance at a lower price when delivery is costly.
This appears to be what they get by failing and margining through the clearing
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corporation. So while failing may sound mischievous or abusive, both our results here
and basic economic reasoning indicate that its role is positive.
The SEC has taken a cautious approach by introducing its new Regulation SHO,
which strengthens delivery requirements for “threshold securities,” those with substantial
current fails. Its effect on large market makers such as our data provider is likely small,
since their hedging trades are still exempt from the locate requirement, and their fails do
not age much (see Boni, 2005, for a complete description of the regulation), but it has the
potential to alter the cost of short exposure, so its impact is an important new empirical
question. Fortunately the lists of threshold securities are public, so proprietary data may
not be necessary to answer it.
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Appendix A. The Details of Short Selling and Delivery
Short sellers sell stock they do not own. In the United States, exchange procedure
generally requires short-sellers to deliver shares to buyers on the third day after the
transaction (t+3)7. Short sellers typically borrow stock and use the proceeds from the
sale as collateral for the loan. Additionally, regulators and brokerages impose varying
margin requirements on short positions. To close, or cover, the position, the short-seller
buys shares and returns the shares to the lender.

A. Borrowing and Rebate Rates
Typically, a short-seller borrows shares from her broker. The proceeds from the
short sale are used as collateral for the stock loan. The collateral earns interest, and the
broker returns some of the interest to the short seller. The interest rate the short seller
earns is known as the rebate rate. Rebate rates are generally lower for smaller investors,
but for a given investor, lower rebate rates indicate more expensive loans. The majority
of loans are cheap, but there are a few expensive loans in stock specials8.
Specials tend to be driven by episodic corporate events resulting in arbitrage
opportunities for short-sellers. (See Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) or D’Avolio (2002)
for examples). Well placed investors, such as hedge funds, will be able to borrow stock
specials and will earn the reduced rebate.

7

See Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2004) for a description of short selling in other countries.
Fitch IBCA’s publicly available report: “Securities Lending and Managed Funds” estimates that the
industry average spread from the fed funds rate to the general collateral rate on U.S. Equities is 21bps.
8
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B. Short-Selling When Borrowing is Difficult
Exchange rules require most market participants to demonstrate that they can
obtain hard to borrow shares before they short sell9. Market makers require an
affirmative determination of borrowable or otherwise attainable shares. In market
parlance, the short-seller needs a “locate” before short selling. However, there is an
exception to the rule. An example is NASD’s rule 3370(b), which exempts the following
transactions from the affirmative determination requirement: “…bona fide market
making transactions by a member in securities in which it is registered as a Nasdaq
market maker, to bona fide market maker transactions in non-Nasdaq securities in which
the market maker publishes a two-sided quotation in an independent quotation medium,
or to transactions which result in fully hedged or arbitraged positions.”

C. Fails and Buy-Ins
If the short sale is made on day t, the short seller’s clearing firm generally delivers
shares on day t+3. However, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC)
procedures state: “each member has the ability to elect to deliver all or part of any short

9

During our sample period, NYSE Rule 440C and NYSE Information Memorandum 91-41 require
affirmative determination (a “locate”) of borrowable or otherwise attainable shares for members who are
not market makers, specialists or odd lot brokers in fulfilling their market-making responsibilities.
Similarly, NASD Rule 3370 and NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, Section 1, Interpretation 04
Paragraph (b)(2)(a) (See Ketchum, 1995, and SEC Release No. 34-35207), and Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 27542 (AMEX) require affirmative determination of borrowable shares during the period
treated in the paper (SEC Release No. 34-37773).
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position.”10 If a clearing firm decides to deliver less than the full amount of shares to its
buyers, the firm is failing to deliver shares.
If the clearing firm fails, the best-case scenario for the short seller is for the
buyer’s broker to allow the fail to continue as long as the short position is open. In this
case, the short seller’s cost of short exposure is the lost interest on the transaction
amount. When borrowing shares, the short-seller would also lose the full interest income
on his collateral in the case of a zero rebate rate. Economically, a failed delivery is the
same as delivery of borrowed stock at a zero rebate rate as long as the buyer’s broker
allows the fail to continue.
In the worst-case scenario, the buyer’s broker insists on delivery by filing a notice
of intention to buy in with the NSCC at t+4 in accordance with NSCC’s Rule 1011. The
notice is retransmitted from the NSCC to the seller’s broker on t+5, and the seller has
until the end of day t+6 to resolve the buy-in liability. If the seller does not resolve the
liability, a “buy-in” occurs: the buyer purchases shares on the seller’s account to force
delivery12. If her position is bought in, the seller may then short sell again to re-establish
the short position. In this case, the short seller will pay the execution costs of the buy-in
and the following short sale every six days13. Figure A1 shows the sequence of events in
each scenario.

10

NSCC Procedures, VII.D.2.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Customer Protection Rule requires clearing firms to possess
shares in fully paid accounts. Clearing firms may attempt to acquire shares to be in compliance with the
SEC’s rule.
12
The seller’s clearing firm buys shares in a buy-in for NYSE and AMEX stocks, the buyer’s clearing firm
buys-in shares of NASDQ stocks.
13
NASD Rule 11810(c)(1)(B) gives buyers the option to buy guaranteed delivery shares, and there have
been complaints regarding the purchase price of guaranteed shares. A limited supply of guaranteed delivery
11
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The NSCC allocates buy-ins across clearing firms and clearing firms allocate buyins across clients. Failing clients can protect themselves against buy-ins at both levels.
Figure A2 shows the institutional structure. In the first stage, the NSCC ranks clearing
firms according to the date of failed deliveries, and the NSCC allocates buy-ins to the
clearing firms with the oldest failed delivery first14. As a result, clearing firms that
frequently change from short to long net positions are less likely to be bought in.
Once the NSCC allocates buy-ins to a clearing firm, that clearing firm must
allocate buy-ins among its clients. Clearing firms have discretion over this second-stage
of the selection decision, and, unlike the first stage, there are no market-wide rules.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that clearing firms use their discretion; they allocate a
disproportionately small number of buy-ins to protected clients.

shares, combined with the transparency of the underlying purpose for the purchase may inflate prices.
Second, according to NASD Regulation’s general counsel Alden Adkins in Weiss (1998), “there are no
hard and fast rules dictating the prices at which buy-ins can take place. But [Adkins] says the prices must
be ‘fair’ – and that the person who sets the price must be prepared to defend it.”
14

This description provided here is a slight simplification of the actual procedure. For a more specific
example of what really happens, assume that N+0 represents the date the Buy-In Notice is filed. Filing
such a notice will give the firm higher priority in settlement on the first business day after filing, N+1 and
on the second business day after filing, N+2, if the long position remains unfilled. On date N+1, if the
position remains unfilled, NSCC submits “retransmittal notices” to the firm(s) with the oldest short position
in the Buy-In stock. These notices specify the Buy-In liability for the short firm and the name of the long
firm instigating the Buy-In. “If several firms have short Positions with the same age, all such Members are
issued Retransmittal Notices, even if the total of their Short Positions exceeds the Buy-In position.”14 Once
they receive the retransmittal notice, other settling trades may move them to a flat or even a long position in
the stock but do not exempt them from their Buy-In liability. The short firm has until the end of day N+2
to resolve their Buy-In liability. Before the retransmittal notice is received, a buy-in liability is removed
once a net long position of sufficient size is established.
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Appendix B. Risk-Free Interest Rates
We construct a database of daily risk-free interest rates using Federal Reserve 1,
7, 15, 30, 60 and 90-day AA financial commercial paper discount rates which we convert
to bond equivalent yields.15 The risk-free rate corresponding to option maturity is
calculated by linearly interpolating between the two closest interest rates. For example,
the risk-free rate for an option with maturity of 6 days would be calculated by linearly
interpolating between the 1-day and the 7-day discount rates.
The method of linear interpolation is an approximation to the true term structure,
and the error inherent in the approximation is greatest for near-term maturities. By using
the rates on commercial paper, the error in minimized relative to rates on T-bills or other
fixed income instruments that are only reported for greater maturities. As a check on our
procedure, we also calculate the risk-free rate with daily GOVPX data on T-bills using a
procedure similar to Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997). The correlation coefficient between
the 3-month AA financial commercial paper rate and the 3-month T-bill rate reported by
the Federal Reserve is 0.98. As a further check, we regress our 3-month commercial
paper rate on the Federal Reserve’s 3-month T-bill rate from September 1997 to August
2001. The intercept is not significantly different from zero, the slope is statistically
significant (the coefficient is 0.90), and the R2 is

15

Bond Equivalent Yield = (Discount/100)(365/360)/(1-(Discount/100)(Time to Maturity/360))
This is equivalent to the yield formula reported in the Wall Street Journal and is commonly used in option
markets and for debt instruments with maturities of less than one year.
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Figure A1. Clearing, Failing and Buying-In
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GLOSSARY
Buy-In – A situation where shares are purchased in the stock market to insure delivery
for a buyer to whom shares are owed.
Clearing – The delivery of shares from buyer to seller. A clearing firm provides clearing
and settlement services for exchange members.
Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) System – An automated book-entry accounting system
that centralizes the settlement of security transactions for the NSCC.
Delivery Versus Payment (DVP) System – A system allowing delivery and payment to
be exchanged instantaneously. DVP is used by market participants for settlements that
are not automatically handled by CNS.
Failure to Deliver – A situation where the seller does not the give the buyer shares on the
settlement date.
General Collateral Rate – The prevailing interest rate earned on borrowers’ collateral for
equity loans.
Guaranteed Delivery – A stock transaction where the seller commits to a settlement date
and allows the buyer to cancel trade if delivery is not made. Delivery terms are
negotiated on a trade-by-trade basis; trades often have non-standard clearing (e.g. t+1)
Locate – An affirmative determination that the short-seller will be able to borrow shares
to deliver to the buyer. Affirmative determination may include assurances from a shortseller that the customer can borrow shares in time for settlement or that the security is
found on “easy to borrow” lists. In some situations, market participants must provide a
locate to the stock market maker before short-selling.
Notice of Intention to Buy-In – An indication to the NSCC that the buyer will force
delivery of shares. After the notice is filed, the buyer’s priority for delivery is increased.
The notice of intention to buy-in can be filed four days after trading if securities are not
delivered.
National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) – Securities clearing organization
providing centralized clearing and settlement for the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.
Hard To Borrow – A situation where stock loans are difficult or expensive.
Institutionally, certain restrictions apply unless a stock is not hard to borrow.
Rebate Rate – The interest rate earned by borrowers on collateral for equity loans.
Rebate rates are reduced below prevailing rates when stocks are on special.

32

Retransmittal Notice – The NSCC’s indication to the seller that the buyer plans to buy-in
shares. A notice of the buyer’s notice to buy-in from the NSCC to the seller. A
retransmittal notice is sent one day after a notice of intention to buy-in has been sent if
the buyer has not received shares.
Settlement – The exchange of shares for payment.
Settlement Date -- The date on which payment is made to settle a trade. For stocks traded
on US exchanges, standard settlement is three days after the trade (t+3).
Short Sale – A transaction where the seller sells shares she does not own.
Specialness – The difference between the general collateral rebate rate and stock-specific
rebate rate. Specialness is typically zero. A stock is said to be on special if specialness is
positive.
Street Name – Brokerage or nominee registration as opposed to the direct account holder
registration. Securities held in street name can be lent to short sellers with the permission
of the owner.
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Table I
Option Database Filters
This table presents the number of observations excluded by each filter applied to the
options database. As in Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997), we delete observations where call
prices are higher than the underlying stock prices (C > S). We delete observations where
call prices are less than the present value of payoffs if exercised (C < S – PV(K) –
PV(Div)). We delete observations where put prices are less than the current value of
exercise (P < K-S). We delete observations where put prices are above their strike prices
(P > K). We also delete options with less than 6 calendar days to maturity or greater than
180 calendar days to maturity and options with a price less than $0.375.
Filters

C,P < .375
tau > 180
tau < 6
C>S
C < S-PV(K)

Filters in Isolation
Obs.
% Original
Excluded
Excluded

Obs.
Exlcluded

Filters in Sequence
% Original
Obs.
Excluded Remaining

% Original
Remaining

19,723,466

100%

3,564,681
3,866,290
1,074,310
0
578,906

18.07%
19.60%
5.45%
0.00%
2.94%

3,564,681
3,744,692
533,918
0
442,774

18.07%
18.99%
2.71%
0.00%
2.24%

16,158,785
12,414,093
11,880,175
11,880,175
11,437,401

81.93%
62.94%
60.23%
60.23%
57.99%

P<K-S

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

11,437,401

57.99%

P>K

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

11,437,401

57.99%
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Table II
Rebate Rates, Failure and Buy-In Frequency
This table presents statistics on the 1998-99 rebate rate, fail and buy-in database from a
large options market maker. Panel A. shows the overall incidence of five equity loan
states in the database: General Collateral (GC), Reduced Rebate (RR), Reduced
Rebate/Fail (RRF), Fail Only (F) and Buy-in (BUY) and the average rebate rate
associated with each state. Panel B. shows the percentage of daily stock positions in each
one of three categories: (i) No Failing, where there are no shares failing delivery, (ii)
Partial Failing, where there is at least one share failing delivery, and (iii) Failing, where
every share is failing delivery. Percentages are based on the total number of
observations,1,512,000.
Loan
State

Panel A. Incidence of Loan States in the Database
Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative
Average
Frequency
Percent
Rebate Rate

GC
RR
RRF
F
BUY

1,379,594
63,343
59,322
9,655
86

91.24
4.19
3.92
0.64
0.01

1,379,594
1,442,937
1,502,259
1,511,914
1,512,000

91.24
95.43
99.36
99.99
100

4.98
1.72
1.50
0.34
0.00

Panel B. Rebate Rates for Failing and Non-Failing Positions
Rebate > 0
Rebate = 0
Rebate < 0

Total

No Failing

98.61%

1.39%

0.00%

95.43%

Partial Failing

59.36%

40.64%

0.00%

3.92%

Failing

10.35%

89.65%

0.00%

0.64%

Total

96.50%

3.50%

0.00%

100%
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Table III
The Distribution of Put-Call Disparity and Specialness
This table describes the distribution of put-call disparity, specialness and rebate rates in
the sample of 4,560,217 strike price and maturity matched put-call pairs. Put-Call
Disparity is the difference between the stock price and the options implied stock price
normalized by the stock price, i.e. (S-Si)/S. Specialness is the difference between the
general rebate rate and the specific rebate rate for a stock. Rebate Rate is the interest rate
on cash collateral in a stock loan.
Put-Call
Disparity
0.0036
0.0028
0.0179
-0.9988
0.5617
-0.0098

Specialness
(%)
0.48
0
1.30
-0.07
5.80
0

Rebate Rate
(%)
4.47
4.85
1.34
0
5.80
0

-0.0053

0

3.00

90 Percentile

0.0140

1.92

5.33

95th Percentile

0.0195

4.50

5.40

Average
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
5th Percentile
10th Percentile
th
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Table IV
Implied Stock Prices and Short Sales Constraints
This table presents estimates from a panel regression of the following form:
∆j,t = a + bSpecialnessj,t + cMoneynessj,t + dTime-to-Maturityj,t + ID(j) + ID(t) + ej,t.
∆j,t is the put call disparity of stock j on day t. Specialnessj,t is the difference between the
general rebate rate on day t and the specific rebate rate for a stock j on day t.
Moneynessj,t is the price of stock j on day t divided by the strike price of the option pair.
Time-to-Maturity is the number of calendar days to expiration of the option. The ID
functions represent a fixed effects treatment of both the cross sectional (by stock) and
time series (by day) effects. The regression uses one put and one call on each stock every
day; of the options with the shortest time to maturity, those with moneyness closest to
one are chosen. Only option pairs are used where the volume and open interest of both
the put and the call are non-zero. Panel B uses borrowing rates from a custodian bank to
examine the impact of specialness on put-call disparity in both borrowing and failing
regimes when stocks are on special. An indicator that takes the value of one when rebate
rates are negative, and zero otherwise, is interacted with specialness to create a second
specialness variable: specialness when rebates are negative, or Negative Specialness. In
Panel B, the sample is limited to stocks with positive specialness. For each regression the
p-value of the Hausman cross-sectional fixed effects specification test is reported.
Panel A. Market Maker’s Specialness

Variable
Intercept
Specialness
Moneyness
Time-to-Maturity
R-Square
Number of Observations
Hausman Test p-Value

Estimate
-0.0071
0.060017
0.006047
0.000017
0.1548
84915
<.0001

Std.Dev.
0.00166
0.00302
0.000782
3.292E-6

t-Stat
-4.27
19.86
7.74
5.06

p-Value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Panel B: Custodial Specialness and Negative Specialness

Variable
Intercept
Specialness
Negative Rebate Specialness
Moneyness
Time-to-Maturity
R-Square
Number of Observations
Hausman Test p-Value

Estimate
-0.00278
0.088
-0.048
0.00242
0.00004
0.2706
29387
<.0001
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Std.Dev.
0.002980
0.000156
0.000171
0.002150
0.000008

t-Stat
-0.93
5.64
-2.83
1.12
5.00

p-Value
0.3511
<.0001
0.0046
0.2613
<.0001

Table V
Implied Volatilities and Short-Sale Constraints
This table presents estimation results from a panel regression of the following form:

σj,timplied - σj,taverage implied = γ0+γ1Moneynessj,t + γ2Time-to-Maturityj,t + γ3Specialnessj,t + ID(j) + ID(t) + ej,t.

σj,timplied
implied

is the implied volatility of a put or a call option for stock j on day t, and σj,taverage
is the average implied volatility of the put and the call for stock j from day t through
expiration. Implied volatilities are calculated using the Cox, Ross and Rubinstein
binomial tree method. One put and one call is selected on each stock every day; of the
options with the shortest time to maturity, those with moneyness closest to one are
chosen. This difference is then regressed on Moneyness, Time-to-Maturity and two
specifications of Specialness: the actual value of specialness and an indicator that takes
the value of one if the stock has specialness greater than 100 bp, and zero otherwise. The
ID functions represent a fixed effects treatment of both cross-sectional (by stock) and
daily (by day) effects. The Hausman fixed effects specification test p-value is reported.
***Indicates Statistical Significance at the 0.1% Level. **Indicates Statistical
Significance at the 1% Level. *Indicates Statistical Significance at the 5% Level.
Calls

Intercept

1.05271

Puts

***

1.053132

***

1.052391

***

0.927512

***

0.917619

***

0.911268

*

Moneyness

-0.03807

**

-0.03803

**

-0.03808

**

0.092928

***

0.092066

***

0.092254

***

Time-to-Maturity

-0.00066

***

-0.00066

***

-0.00066

***

-0.00084

***

-0.00084

***

-0.00084

***

0.605971

***

0.01678

***

Specialness

-0.02581

100 bp Indicator
Observations
2

0.00033
84915

84915

84915

R

0.6640

0.6640

0.6640

Hausman

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001
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84915

84915

84915

0.6776

0.6782

0.6779

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

Table VI
Buy-In Execution
This table presents statistics on the execution of buy ins in 1998 and 1999 for a major
market making firm. After merging the database with TAQ, there are 85 buy-in
observations on 24 unique stocks. The execution quality of the buy-ins is examined by
comparing the buy-in prices to the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) over the
trading day, (SBUYIN – SVWAP ) / SVWAP. In Panel A, we report the mean, median and
standard deviation of the execution costs. Additionally, we report a t-test of the null
hypothesis that the difference is zero. If multiple buy-in events are recorded on a single
day, the buy-in price used in the calculations is the quantity-weighted execution price. In
Panel B, we report the quantity of shares bought-in and the number of trading days from
buy-in to settlement.
Panel A: Execution Costs
Mean
0.0053
Median
0.0028
Std.Dev.
0.0178
t-stat
2.75
p-Value
0.01
Panel B: Buy-In Quantity and Timing
Buy-In
Trading Days to
Quantity
Settlement
Mean
9,512
3.01
Median
3,915
3
Std.Dev.
14,450
0.24
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Table VII
Put-Call Arbitrage Profits
This table lists arbitrage profits from short selling stock and buying a strike and time to
maturity matched combination of options to replicate the underlying stock. The short
stock, long synthetic stock arbitrage trade is put on whenever the stock is on special, and
closed at option expiration. Borrowing costs are included in the profit calculation. If the
database indicates a buy-in occurs while the position is open, the short position is closed
at the indicated buy-in price. The short-sale is then re-established that day using the
volume-weighted average price. There are no positions where the underlying stock paid
a dividend in the previous year. Trade duration is the number of days a particular
position is open. Signed trade profit indicates the percentage of individual positions with
positive and negative profits. The strategy uses one option-pair per stock (the pair that is
closest to the money and nearest term in maturity).

Arbitrage Profit
Trade Duration (in days)
Signed Trade Profit

N
Mean Std. Dev.
6086
0.1346 0.4579
Median
Mean
35
47.66
Positive Negative
67.58% 32.42%
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t-Stat
22.93

p-Value
<0.001

Table VIII
Incidence of Maximum Spreads
This table presents estimation results from a probit regression of the incidence of
maximum option quote spreads on specialness and other control variables. To construct
the dependent variable, call and put options are matched by underlying stock, time to
maturity and strike price. The dependent variable is one if both the put and the call have
quoted spreads at their maximums, and zero otherwise. AbsVal(1-Moneyness) is the
absolute value of [1 – (stock price)/(strike price)]. Volume is the sum of the daily
volume for the put and the call. Open interest is the sum of open interest for the put and
the call. Time-to-maturity is the number of days to the expiration of the option. Fixed
cross-sectional effects (by stock) are included in the regression.
Parameter
Intercept
Specialness
AbsVal(1-Moneyness)
Volume
Open Interest
Time to Maturity

Estimate
-2.5377
1.1680
0.1881
-0.0001
-0.0001
0.0003
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P-Value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
< 0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Average Marg. Effect
0.00572
0.12462
267.366
2237.01
60.2556

0.4637
0.0747
-0.00004
-0.00002
0.0001

Table IX
Determinants of Buy-Ins
This table presents estimation results from a probit regression of buy-ins on specialness,
short interest and other potentially predictive variables. The regression is specified so the
probability of being bought-in is estimated. Option turnover is the average ratio of the
daily volume divided by the current open interest for the put/call pair that is trading
closest to the money and nearest term in maturity on the underlying stock. Specialness is
the cost of short-selling. Short interest is the monthly total short position in a stock
reported by the exchanges. Shares outstanding is the CRSP reported number of total
shares outstanding on the stock. Standard deviation is calculated from daily returns over
the previous six months. Price Indicator takes the value of 1 for stocks with a closing
midquotes less than or equal to $5, and zero otherwise. The sample comprises 64 buy-in
events and 33201 non-buy-in events. The reported marginal effect is calculated as the
average marginal effect for a 1 unit change in all observations in the sample. *Because
the option turnover variable is used to test the hypothesis of refreshing the age of the
market maker’s failure to deliver and thereby lowering the position of the market maker
on the list of buyin allocations, they hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient.
Consequently, the p-value for option turnover is from a 1-sided test.
Parameter
Intercept
Option Turnover
Specialness (%)
Log(Short Interest)
Log(Shares Outstanding)
Daily Std. Dev. (6 Months) (%)
Price Indicator (<$5)

Estimate
-3.367
-0.287
0.330
0.082
-0.353
-0.041
4.240

46

P-Value
< 0.001
0.035*
< 0.001
0.061
< 0.001
0.086
< 0.001

Marg. Effect
-0.0016
0.0018
0.0005
-0.0020
-0.0002
0.0234

